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What is drug safety? We always say that drugs
approved by the FDA are safe, and in the public
mind that means they do not have any side affects.
They are safe. What does it mean legally? The Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act just says that you will do
adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable
to show whether or not such a drug is safe for use
under such conditions. Notice that it does not tell
you what safe for use is. The problem is that no
drug, as you well know, is 100% safe. The FDA has
long used a working deﬁnition of safety: that the
beneﬁts outweigh the foreseeable risks for a speciﬁc
indication in a speciﬁc population. and that is what
the drug development program needs to show. So in
approving a product, the FDA determines, and this
is a very simple way of looking at it, that the beneﬁt
of the drug exceeds the risk for that population.
This is not about just numerical beneﬁt and numer-
ical risk. This evaluation includes weights or values
that are assigned to all those risks and the values
that are assigned to the beneﬁt. So this very difﬁcult
determination is whether the weight of a drug’s ben-
eﬁts is weightier for the population than the weight
of the risks. There is another step after a drug is
approved—that is, for each patient and each pre-
scriber to make an individual decision based on per-
sonal values. You do not have to take a drug. It is
not like many other risks that are introduced into
society. But for the FDA, determination about drug
approval relates to the population.
Now how do we assign these risks and these
beneﬁts? In vitro data are useful in the preclinical
phase, in early clinical development. We also use in
vitro data on carcinogenicity because you cannot
do that kind of testing in humans obviously, but
otherwise most lab data are not really put into the
equation. Also during drug development, animal
toxicity data are gathered, and these are mostly
used for the safety of the subjects in the clinical
trials; what is the proper starting dose? How much
can people tolerate? The animal toxicity data,
unlike, for example, in the environmental world,
would not be used much in weighing the risks at the
approval decision for a drug. But, animal carcino-
genicity and animal reproductive toxicity are used
and that is because we cannot do these speciﬁc tests
in humans.
Most of the prediction of risk we arrive at when
approving a drug is based on human data that have
been gathered during clinical trials before the drug
is approved. The premarket exposure of people usu-
ally is around 2,000 to 10,000 with varying dura-
tion, varying dose, and different kinds of concurrent
illnesses. The problem with this is the limited power
of such exposure to detect an association with an
event that occurs at a rate of maybe 1 in 300 to 1 in
1000. The detection ability also depends on the
background rate in the population. Many fairly
common effects, say those that occur in 1 in 500
people or 1 in 1000 people might not be seen in the
premarket exposure. These effects would emerge
only when millions of people are exposed to the
drug after marketing. If you are lucky enough to
observe an infrequent event at all, you rarely have
an ability to quantify it or develop any kind of rea-
sonable estimate of the rate of that event.
What we ﬁnd when we expose people to phar-
maceuticals before they are marketed is a huge
range of side affects, most minor, some moderate,
and some occasionally very severe. To improve this
situation we are hoping that new science will give us
a real leg up on this. It is not desirable to wait until
you have seen a catastrophic event. You would like
to be able to predict it from some other data that
you have; for example, we are looking at the QTc
interval, which is an electrocardiographic marker of
heart electrical system toxicity to predict the possi-
bility of sudden death in susceptible individuals.
Similarly, perhaps there are better tests of liver
function or liver damage to help us predict which
drugs are going to go on to cause catastrophic liver
failure and which ones, like aspirin, just raise liver
enzymes occasionally. Human biomarkers have
some promise.
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In addition, there is a great hope that pharma-
cogenomics, the science of how genetic makeup
interacts with drug therapy, will help us identify the
sources of human variability that determine why
only some people develop problems. Medical peo-
ple call these reactions idiosyncratic, which is
another way of saying we do not know anything
about the cause. But there must be a reason, a sci-
entiﬁc reason why some people get ill from drugs. It
is not just chance, it is simply that we do not know
the reason and so we dismiss it as idiosyncratic.
Pharmacogenomics may help us determine more
of the metabolic differences in humans that lead to
drug toxicity; may provide and have provided actu-
ally in some cases, markers for catastrophic risk
that some people with a certain gene or lacking a
certain gene are the ones that will get a catastrophic
risk from a pharmaceutical; or may help us identify
the people who will not beneﬁt at all from a drug so
these individuals are not exposed.
Drug/drug interactions are another way of pre-
dicting risk, which is a partial success story. In the
past decade, we ﬁgured out, we being the biomedi-
cal community involved in this, how to determine
how drugs are metabolized, in vitro and in small
human studies, and pick out the really bad actor
drugs, the drugs that are going to inhibit the metab-
olism of other drugs. Many of the drug withdrawals
over the past decade have related to drugs that
cause drug/drug interactions. So the new science
may help us quantify that risk a lot better. But we
are not there yet.
Now what about predicting beneﬁt of a speciﬁc
pharmaceutical? As you all know we do that from
randomized controlled trials and there are prob-
lems with these trials. At a minimum they show us
whether or not the drug works. and that is more
than you can say about a lot of other study designs
that are not randomized controlled trials. But they
lack generalizability to the population that is going
to be exposed to the drug. They often do not meas-
ure all the domains and this is really a problem
when you are trying to weigh beneﬁt against risk
and you really have not measured all the beneﬁt.
What really bothers me is that we look at the pop-
ulation means; we do a statistical approach to ben-
eﬁt, and we say there is only, for example, 7%
more beneﬁt in the treated population over the pla-
cebo or active control population. The problem
with this concept is that it says little about
responders. It is true for a cancer drug, for exam-
ple, that perhaps you only get one chance and so it
is appropriate to look at the population mean. But
for most chronic diseases, clinicians try one medi-
cine and, if it does not work, they try another med-
icine. This gets back to pharmacogenomics. Some
people respond to a drug and some do not. and so
when we are looking at beneﬁt, for many drugs
there is probably a small proportion of people who
beneﬁt greatly, but this translates statistically to a
small mean beneﬁt to all.
So, when we approve a product, we have made a
prediction that the beneﬁt is going to exceed the
risk. There are some problems that can develop. We
may have done a bad job; we may have missed some
of those rare serious adverse events. We did not
have any biomarkers that predicted them and they
show up afterward. Another problem is what the
Institute of Medicine has called medical errors. I
was pleased to be able to go through your poster
session downstairs and, I must say, it was a hair-
raising experience, to see in some cases, for serious
risks, that only 2% of the prescribers followed the
treatment recommendations. The message here is
that medical errors, misuse of the product in some
way or another, can really tip this balance over and
the drug is going to start causing more harm when
it is actually out there than was predicted because
we did not predict how this product was going to be
misused, in a manner of speaking. A drug can actu-
ally turn out to be less safe if it is used in a way that
decreases the foreseeable beneﬁt. For example,
using a drug recommended for a sick population in
people who really are not very sick, who have less
to gain and more to lose, diminishes the beneﬁt/
risk proportion. Coprescribing with contraindi-
cated drugs increases the risk. Or, and this is the one
that gets all the press, if the actual risks are greater
than predicted; in other words, if we miss some-
thing in our predictions.
There are values: some weights on that balance
that you do not think of, that cause risks to weigh
more for a newly approved drug. This is a well-
known fact about risk perception: anything strange
or unusual or new or whatever is perceived as more
serious or severe than something we are accustomed
to. For example, the nonsteroidal anti-inﬂamma-
tory agents are probably the most toxic drugs we
have on the market for non-life-threatening condi-
tions, and yet, people do not really think much
about their risks.
When you look at that balance and you think
about the risks, one way we can keep that beneﬁt
positive is not just by sitting back and waiting for
things to happen but by actually trying to inﬂuence
or manage how the drug is used or manage some of
those risks. You could make interventions that max-
imize the beneﬁt of the drug; you could make inter-
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ventions that minimize the risk of the drug, the goal
being to a positive beneﬁt/risk analysis so that the
drug remains safe in terms of the meaning that we
have given to safe.
What are the sources of preventable risks? It is
hard to manage inherent risks, but what about pre-
ventable risks of drugs? The Institute of Medicine
has done a whole report about medical errors
called “To Err is Human”: errors clearly are a large
source of drug risk. Probably the greatest source of
risk is inappropriate or contraindicated prescribing,
prescribing in the face of a known elevated risk. A
prescriber may have good reasons for this, as I will
get into later, or it may be pure ignorance. Another
source of risk is drug/drug interactions. Another
source is failure to appropriately monitor the
patient after being put on the therapy to make sure
risks are controlled properly. and another, which
gets a lot of press, is a mix-up. Medical mix-ups
occur when one drug is accidentally substituted for
another drug, and the patient may die because he or
she was given something completely inappropriate.
Another source of decreased beneﬁt/risk is not
managing the beneﬁt side properly. Using a drug
with a lot of risks in a low beneﬁt population is
really changing that balance, and again that can be
done by ignorance on the part of the prescriber or
may be done with full knowledge. But we hope that
it    is done with full knowledge of the patients, of
the risks they are assuming for the beneﬁts might
accrue to them; off-label use of this kind of falls
into this category. The patient can make errors of
use that up the ante; for example, patients may give
the drug to a neighbor or they do not know about
drug/drug interactions. Poor adherence, which is
rampant among patients, often will expose the per-
son to all the risks of the drug, with decreased
beneﬁt.
Risk management in the pharmaceutical setting
is intended to alter behavior patterns that lead to
excess risks, these preventable risks. Examples
include avoiding an at-risk population. A good
example is the risk management program for tha-
lidomide. Thalidomide is a major human teratogen.
A very stringent program was put into place when
thalidomide was approved that is intended to pre-
vent pregnant women from taking thalidomide.
Accutane® is a widely used acne drug with the same
problem. It is a major human teratogen and preg-
nant women should not take it. We discovered a
couple of years ago women were starting on Accu-
tane when they were already pregnant. This is a
medical error that should never happen. And, there-
fore, additional steps were put into place to make
sure that no pregnant women take Accutane. That
program is new and we will see how it works over
time. But that is an example of trying to proactively
manage a risk. With Clozaril® we tried to avoid
severe blood dyscrasia by monitoring the white
blood cell counts. But that did not happen just by
putting it in the label and saying monitor the white
blood cell counts. So a program was put into place:
you now cannot get a prescription unless you have
a white blood cell count performed—very simple,
an aviation model, fail-safe, and it worked. We have
the outcome data as far as adverse event reports of
dyscrasia; it worked.
Household safety is another issue with pharma-
ceuticals, as more and more home health care
occurs, there are more and more substances around
the home that used to be locked up in the hospital
pharmacy. What do we need to do to keep children
from being killed by getting into these substances?
There are common-sense practical steps to minimize
that risk. The FDA has tried to maximize beneﬁts
with the weight loss drugs by targeting a severity
level. This is widely disregarded by the practition-
ers, as are many other label recommendations.
Another way to maximize beneﬁt might be to avoid
off-label use or, as we talked about with pharma-
cogenomics, perhaps targeting subpopulations that
would really beneﬁt from the drug.
If you are contemplating an intervention to min-
imize risk, you need to ask a number of questions.
First you must ask when you are confronted with a
risk: is it really associated with the drug? What is
the level of evidence that the drug actually causes
this risk? Often people get really excited about a
risk that turns out not to be associated with the
drug. Then you have to ask yourself, how large is
this risk, if associated with the drug? For example,
with Accutane we knew that women who were
exposed within a certain period of gestation would
have a very high probability of having a child with
developmental defects. On the other hand, there
has been a lot of discussion about Accutane and
neuropsychiatric problems in people who are tak-
ing the drug, including depression and potential
suicides. Is this associated with the drug? We do not
have very much information about Accutane and
neuropsychiatric side effects. So we are still in the
phase of determining association for that particular
side effect. Then you have to ask also, what is the
role of medical error in causing the risk or is this an
inherently nonpreventable risk? If this drug were
used perfectly, according to every guideline, would
this risk still be there? For example, bone marrow
depression with chemotherapy is like this: we just
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do not know how to use those drugs in a way that
avoids bone marrow toxicity.
Then the next question you would have to ask is,
what would be the beneﬁt of the intervention?
Again I see people who do not go through these
steps. We need to measure the beneﬁts. What is the
intervention intended to accomplish? Often I see
people proposing interventions that are not going to
accomplish controlling a risk, simply because they
are worried. Then you have to ask, how would I tell
if I have succeeded? What is an acceptable level of
success with the intervention? And very impor-
tantly, how do you evaluate that? It is no good
putting in place various schemes if you cannot really
tell whether they work or not, and obviously, to do
that, you need some baseline information.
Next you have to talk to yourself or your group
about the cost of the intervention. There are many
kinds of costs, not just dollar costs. There are oper-
ational costs to whomever is doing this, of whatever
intervention it might be; there is a burden on the
health-care system. We know this is true with tha-
lidomide and we know this is true with Accutane,
but we think from a societal point of view and I
think the companies believe as well that preventing
damaged infants is worth this cost and burden. But
there is a burden of time and efﬁciency loss in an
already burdened health-care system. There also
may be loss of access to the drug of patients or pre-
scribers and this must be taken into account, and
there may economic costs or loss of privacy on the
part of the patient. This is something we have to
weigh very carefully and think about. Another thing
you do not think about always but needs to be
considered—are there unintended consequences?
We believe that we have already seen unintended
consequences of risk management programs for
pharmaceuticals. One new pharmaceutical was sur-
rounded by a very careful program to manage a par-
ticular risk. The program added some burden, and
therefore the practitioners chose a potentially riskier
drug that does not have any burden associated with
it. They prescribe that drug instead. There are other
kinds of unintended consequences. We can burden
the health-care system in a way that could create
other risks, other errors, and other mistakes. So you
really have to think through all the unintended con-
sequences as you are contemplating an intervention.
Often, we do not really understand the basic or
fundamental cause or source of the risk. and it is
really hard to treat something if you do not have the
proper diagnosis. So if you think it is one cause and
it is really another cause, you are not going to get
any value from your intervention. An example is in
the drug Propulsid, which was withdrawn from the
market after it was associated with sudden death.
When we looked at the use of the drug in practice,
in some settings half the patients prescribed Propul-
sid were taking contraindicated drugs or had con-
traindicated conditions. Propulsid was a drug for
heartburn, so it is unlikely that practitioners
thought their patient absolutely must be prescribed
this drug, although the drug was used for other indi-
cations, so that is possible. Why did it happen?
Were the prescribers unaware of the contraindica-
tions? Was that the root cause? Did the prescriber
not believe the warnings? We have certainly heard
that a lot. Practitioners tend to be anecdotal: I have
never seen it in my practice, so it does not happen.
Right? Or did the prescriber decide the contraindi-
cation was not relevant in this case? Or did the
patient receive many different prescriptions from
different prescribers who in fact did not communi-
cate with one another and so the interaction
occurred because of a problem in the health-care
system? Until you understand the sources of the sce-
nario, you really cannot intervene properly.
We have lessons in safety from other ﬁelds that
can be applied. and this does not have to do with
the FDA; this has to do with the health-care system
as a whole. The best tools are built in; we know this
from aviation and we know this from other safety
areas. They should not require a lot of user effort
and thought. A risk management intervention
should not require a lot of effort, because people are
going to forget to do it. Approaches that build
safety into systems are vastly preferable to piece-
meal solutions. Standardization is one of the major
safety tools, and that is true for all different disci-
plines that have safety programs that have looked at
safety. Forcing functions, in other words, con-
straints, are very effective and that is an example of
thalidomide or Accutane where there are actually
constraints built into the system that would make it
really, really hard to dispense those drugs to a preg-
nant woman. That is not saying that it will not hap-
pen, but it would be really, really hard. That is a
constraint.
Redundancy is an important aspect of safety as
well. For health care, you need to avoid reliance on
memory and avoid reliance on vigilance. However,
the professional model that health care uses is mem-
ory and vigilance. It is not a systems approach; it is
a “professional” approach where it is posited that
each professional will remember everything. Unfor-
tunately, in today’s world of pharmaceuticals, that
is not possible. It is not possible to remember eve-
rything; there is too much information. Back when
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we just had morphine, penicillin, sulfa drugs, and a
couple of others, it was possible, but not now.
Anticipate the unexpected. At the FDA, we ago-
nize over mix-ups. Who would have thought that
people could mix up some of the names of drugs
that have been mixed up? One is a parenteral for-
mulation and one is a pill, and how could you pos-
sibly get those mixed up? Well, you can.
Improve access to timely and accurate informa-
tion. At the FDA we realize that one of the deﬁcits
is that the prescribers do not have that important
information in front of them at the time of prescrib-
ing. They do not have information about the con-
traindications and what else the patient is on; they
are relying on memory, they are relying on vigilance,
and it is not enough.
Do our current risk management programs, the
few that have been put in place for pharmaceuticals,
ﬁt the paradigm? Do they have the ideal character-
istics? No. Most of them rely on constraints, but
when we evaluated them, they are effective. Con-
straints are effective. But they are burdensome. We
cannot have hundreds of constraint systems out
there, the constraints themselves will cause other
errors, and they will have unintended consequences.
They are burdensome and they lack a standard
approach. So what have we learned about manag-
ing the risks of medicine? We have learned that for
the health-care community, the way the drug is set
up at the initial launch is important. Practitioners or
prescribers will respond to that initial information,
maybe because that is the only time they read it.
Late follow-up with “dear doctor” letters or other
information, directed at practitioners, no matter
how intense it is, has much less impact. It is really
hard to change a behavior once it is established.
That drug interaction information is not followed
is a total understatement. Drug/drug interaction
knowledge appears to be fairly scanty among prac-
titioners and I have considerable sympathy for this.
I blame in part the clinical pharmacologists who use
all those little alphanumeric acronyms for enzyme
systems! Communications after practice patterns
are established are not completely effective in
changing practices, even though those practices may
lead to fatal results. Practitioners resent burden-
some programs. We need evaluation, and we need it
from the outcomes community. We need to ﬁgure
out what are the beneﬁts when you put a program
like this into place. What are the costs? What are
the unintended consequences?
Society's dilemma is that while we all share com-
mon goals of minimizing the risks and maximizing
the beneﬁts of drugs, we lack a consensus on how to
achieve this. Many people feel (but I do not know
how much data they have) that if we controlled
error better we would actually save a lot of money
in the health-care system. I think that is probably
true, but I have no data to back that up. How much
are we willing to pay? Even if there would be an
ultimate return on investment, there is going to be
an up-front cost. How much are we willing to pay
in money, how much are we willing to pay in loss of
autonomy for health-care practitioners? That is
really a big issue, as you know. How much are we
willing to pay in time and effort in an already bur-
dened health-care system, to minimize risk, to max-
imize beneﬁt of drugs?
What about irreducible risk? This is a values
question that our society appears to be incapable of
having a really informed debate about. How much
is tolerable? How much irreducible risk of a drug is
tolerable? Who should decide? At the bottom line,
we feel that a patient, and prescriber, should decide
together for that patient. But who should decide
globally?
In summary, continued drug marketing depends
on continued favorable beneﬁt risk analysis. Our
prediction at the time of approval may not be borne
out by the facts when millions of people are exposed
to a drug. But the good news is that we can be
proactive in minimizing risk and maximizing bene-
ﬁt. We do not have to sit passively by while this
unfolds. Interventions work best before practice
patterns are established. Additional tools are
needed and evaluation of outcomes must be incor-
porated into risk management programs.
This presentation about the application of risk manage-
ment techniques to drug development and pharmaceuti-
cals was given May 21, 2002, at the ISPOR 7th Annual
International Meeting during the Second Plenary Session,
“The Rise of Risk Management” held in Arlington, VA,
USA.
